Page:A Collection of Several Philosophical Writings of Dr. Henry More.djvu/204

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Chap. VI.
An Appendix to the foregoing Antidote

jector himself: for whereas I urge, That either Impossibility, Contingency or Necessity of Actual Existence belongs to a Being absolutely Perfect, he confesses here, that the Manichean God will succour him no longer; but as a man lest in distress he complains, that it is an hard case, that we must be put to prove the Existence of God impossible, or else we must be forced to admit that he is. But afterwards being better advised, he takes notice that if he be not, it is impossible for him to be; and therefore, say I, it is but just that we expect of him that will deny that he is, to prove his Being impossible, especially the force of our Argument so necessarily casting him upon it. But in my conceit he had better save his pains, then venture upon so frustraneous an undertaking: for he may remember that the Idea, of this Being absolutely Perfect is so fram'd, that in the judgement of any man that has the use of his Faculties, there is no inconsistency nor incompossibility therein, nor the least shadow for suspicion or shyness. And besides, since impossibility of existing is the most imperfefect χέσις that any Being can bear to Existence, it must needs be an outragious incongruity to attribute it to a Being absolutely Perfect, it so naturally and undeniably belonging to a Being absolutely Imperfect, chap. 5. sect. hath been noted before.

Wherefore if either the doubting or obdurate Atheist will say the Existence of God is impossible, that will not argue any weakness or vanity in my Argument, but rash boldness and blind impudency in him that shall return so irrational an Answer.

6. Antidote, Book 1. chap. 8. sect. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11.But the Objector has arrived now to the fourth and last posture of our Argumentation, of which he conceives this is the utmost summe, That either there is a God, or Matter is of it self; but Matter is not of it self, because necessary Existence is not included in the Idea thereof. Against which he alledges, that as thousands have the Idea of a Triangle, and yet have not any knowledge of that property of having the three Angles equal to two right ones, so a man may have the Idea of Matter, and yet know nothing of the necessity of its Existence, though it have that property in it.

But I answer. This does not reach the force of our Argument; for look as curiously and skilfully as you will into the Idea of Matter, and you can discover no such property as necessity of Existence therein. And then again, the weight of my reasoning lieth mainly in this, That necessity of Self-existence being so plainly and unavoidably discoverable in the Idea of a Being absolutely Perfect, but not at all discernible in the Idea of Matter; that we doe manifest violence to our Faculties while we acknowledge Self-existence in Matter, no Faculty informing us so, and deny it in God, the Idea of God so conspicuously informing us that necessary Self-existence belongs unto him. So that all that I contend for is this, That he that denies a God, runs counter to the light of his Natural Faculties, to which I perpetually appeal.

7. But if you will still say. It may be our Faculties are false; I say so too, that it might be so if there were no God by whom we were made; for then we were such as we finde our selves, and could seek no further, nor assure our selves but that we might be of that nature, as to be then