6. But as for his following Reasons, that suppose the ** Per Realitatem objectivam Ideæ intelligo entitatē rei repræsentatæ per Ideam quatenus est in Idea. Nam quæcunque percipimus tanquam in Idearum objectis, ea sunt in ipsis Ideis objectivé. Cartes. Resp. ad Object. 2. Metaphys. Defin. 3. Objective Reality of the Idea of God does exceed the efficiency of the Mind of man, and that the Mind of man, were it not from another, would have conferr'd all that perfection upon it self that it has the Idea of, and, lastly, that it having no power to conserve itself, and the present and future time having no dependence one of another, that it is continually produc'd, that is, conserv'd, by some higher Cause, which must be God; these grounds, I say, being so easily evaded by the Atheist, I durst not trust to them, unless had the Author's wit to defend them, who was handsomly able to make good any thing. But they seem to me to be liable to such evasions as I can give no stop to.
For the Mind of man, as the Atheist will readily reply, may be able of her self to frame such an actual Idea of God as is there disputed of, which Idea will be but the present modification of her, as other Notions are, and an effect of her essence and power, and that power a radical property of her essence. So that there is no excess of an Effect above the efficiency of the Cause, though we look no further then the Mind it self; for she frames this Notion of God as naturally and as much without the help of an higher Cause, as she does any thing else whatsoever.
And as for the Mind's contributing those perfections on her self she has an Idea of; if she had been of her self, the Atheist will say, it implies a contradiction, and supposes that a thing before it exists may consult about the advantages of its own existence. But if the Mind be of it self, it is what it findes it self to be, and can be no otherwise.
And therefore, lastly, if the Mind finde it self to exist, it can no more destroy it self then produce it self; nor needs any thing to continue its Being, provided that there be nothing in Nature that can act against it and destroy it; for whatever is, continues so to be, unless there be some Cause to change it.
7. So likewise from those Arguments I fetch'd from external Nature, as well as in these from the innate properties of
