Page:A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Confederacy, Including the Diplomatic Correspondence, 1861-1865, Volume I.djvu/191

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Provisional Congress.
163

ernment of the Army and undertaking to administer the Army by statute. When rules are established for the regulation of such matters as are in their nature susceptible of fixed and unvarying application, there can be no impolicy in providing them by statute. Thus we have by law fixed guides for organization, for the composition of the different corps, for the number of officers and their grades, for the respective duties assigned to the staff in its several branches, and numerous like provisions that remain in force in all localities, in the presence as well as the absence of the enemy, and uninfluenced by the exigencies of any particular occasion. But there are other matters which are essentially administrative in their character, and are not susceptible of being determined by the rigid prescriptions of statutes which executive officers are bound to obey under all circumstances and without the exercise of any discretion. Suppose Congress should attempt to fix by law of what camp equipage should always consist, or the precise kind and quality of clothing to be furnished, or the exact amount and kind of transportation to be allowed for each regiment, is it not obvious that these details depend so entirely on time, place, and circumstances, and are so essentially variable in their character, that the uniform compliance with such laws would be practically impossible? Suppose Congress should establish by law the precise proportion of infantry, cavalry, and artillery to be attached to each body of troops in service. This would not be a rule for the government of the Army, but an attempt at a. statutory administration of it which could not but be found impolitic, even if it were practicable.

Now, the act in question presents precisely the same objectionable features. It establishes a rule over which there is no discretionary power under any circumstances whatsoever by which a commanding general, in the face of superior numbers and with his capacity for defense taxed to the utmost, may find his forces still further reduced by the action of his subordinates, not only against his consent, but without his knowledge, and in ignorance of his necessities and the purposes of their Government. No more striking example could be afforded of the impolicy of such a law than is presented by our condition at this time. Our armies are in force inferior to the enemy at the two points most vital to the defense of the country. The enlistment of the twelve-months' men