Human Liberty.
97
not to be very numerous; but on the contrary, they will find far the greater part of the pretended asserters of liberty, to be real asserters of necessity.
The Author’s notion of Liberty.I shall conclude this Discourse with observing; that tho’ I have contended, that Liberty from Necessity is contrary to experience; that it is impossible; and if possible, that it is imperfection; that it is inconsistent with the divine perfections; and that it is subversive of laws and morality: yet to prevent all objections to me, founded on the equivocal use of the word Liberty, which, like all words employ’d in debates of consequence, has various meanings affix’d to it, I think myself oblig’d to declare my opinion that I take man to have a truly valuable liberty of another kind. He has a power to do as he wills or pleases. Thus, if he wills or pleases to speak or be silent; to sit or stand, to ride or walk; to go this way or that way; to move fast or slow; or, in fine, if his will changes like a weathercock, he is able to do as he wills or pleases: unless