Page:A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty (3rd ed., 1735).djvu/15

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Human Liberty.
11

found subject, ought to have some Ideas, to be the objects of his thoughts in the same manner as he has in thinking on the most common subjects: for where Ideas fail us in any matter, our thoughts must also fail us. And it is plain, whenever we have Ideas, we are able to communicate them to others by words[1]: for words being arbitrary marks of our ideas, we can never want them to signify our Ideas, as long as we have so many in use among us, and a power to make as many more as we have occasion for. Since then we can think of nothing any farther than we have Ideas, and can signify all the Ideas we have by words to one another; why should we not be able to put one Idea into a Proposition as well as another? Why not to compare ideas together about one subject as well as another? And why not to range one sort of Propositions into order and method, as well as another? When we use the term God, the Idea signify'd thereby, ought to be as distinct

  1. I do not mean unknown simple Ideas. These can at first only be made known by application of the object to the faculty: but when they have been once perceiv'd, and a common name agreed upon to signify them, they can be communicated by Words.