Page:A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty (3rd ed., 1735).djvu/17

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Human Liberty.
13

I would not hereby be thought to suppose that the Idea of God is an adequate Idea, and exhausts the subject it refers to, like the Idea of a triangle or a square; or that it is as easy to form in our Minds as the Idea of a triangle or a square; or that it does not require a great comprehension of Mind to bring together the various Ideas that relate to God, and so compare them together; or that there are not several Propositions concerning him that are doubtful, and of which we can arrive at no certainty; or that there are not many Propositions concerning him subject to very great Difficulties or objections. All these I grant: but I say, they are no Reasons to justify Obscurity. For, first, an inadequate Idea is no less distinct, as such, than an adequate Idea, and no less true, as far as it goes; and therefore may be discours’d of with equal clearness and truth. Secondly, Tho’ the Idea of God be not so easy to form in our Minds as the Idea of a triangle or a square, and it requires a great comprehension of Mind to bring together the various Ideas that relate to him, and compare them together; yet these are only reasons, for using a greater application, or for not writing at all. Third-