was of this treatise of Episcopius, who in all his other writings, shews himself to be a clear, strong and argumentative writer.
4. There are others, and those contenders for Liberty, as well as denyers of it, who report the persuasions of Men, as to the Matter of fact, very differently, and also judge very differently themselves about the fact, from what is vulgarly believed among those who mantain Free-will.
An ancient author speaks thus[1]: Fate, says he, is sufficiently proved from the general receiv’d opinion and persuasion of Men thereof. For, in certain things, when Men all agree, except a few, who dissent from them on account of maintaining some doctrines before taken up, they cannot be mistaken. Wherefore Anaxagoras the Clazomenian, tho’ no contemptible Naturalist, ought not be judged to deserve any regard, when opposing the common persuasion of all Men he asserts, “That nothing is done by Fate; but that it is an empty name.” And according to all authors, recording the opinions of men in this matter, the belief of Fate, as to all Events, has continued to be the most com-
- ↑ Alexander de Fato p. 10.
