power to do, he cannot but have some immediate will.
Hence appears the mistake of those who[1] think men at liberty to will, or not to will, because, say they, they can suspend willing, in relation to actions to be done to morrow; wherein they plainly confound themselves, with words. For when it is said, man is necessarily determin'd to will; it is not thereby understood, that he is determin'd to will or chuse one out of two objects immediately in every case propos'd to him (or to chuse at all in some cases; as whether he will travel into France or Holland), but that on every proposal he must necessarily have some will. And he is not less determin'd to will, because he does often suspend willing or chusing in certain cases: for suspending to will is itself, an act of willing; it is willing to defer willing about the matter propos'd. In fine, tho' great stress is laid on the case of suspending the will, to prove liberty, yet there is no difference between that and the most common cases of willing and chusing upon the manifest excellency of one object before another. For as when a man wills or chuses living in En-
- ↑ Locke of Hum. Und. l. 2. c. 21.
