nother, and for other reasons, make the cause of the determination of man's will less easy to be known, and consequently serve to no other purpose but to darken the question, which may be better determin'd by considering, whether man be free to will or no in more important instances. 2. Secondly, I answer, that whenever a choice is made, there can be no equality of circumstances preceding the choice. For in the case of chusing one out of two or more eggs, between which there is no perceivable difference; there is not, nor can there be, a true equality of circumstances and causes preceding the act of chusing one of the said eggs. It is not enough to render things equal to the will, that they are equal or alike in themselves. All the various modifications of the man, his opinions, prejudices, temper, habit, and circumstances are to be taken in, and consider'd as causes of election no less than the objects without us among which we chuse; and these will ever incline or determine our wills, and make the choice we do make, preferable to us, tho' the external objects of our choice are ever so much alike to each other. And, for example,in
