action alone, as we are to act according to our will, had no such external impediment to action happen'd. If also we change our wills after we have begun any of these actions, we find we necessarily leave off these actions and follow the new will or choice. And this was Aristotle's sense of such actions of man. As, says he,[1] in arguing we necessarily assent to the inference or conclusion drawn from premises, so if that arguing relate to practice, we necessarily act upon such inference or conclusion. As for example, when we argue thus, whatever is sweet is to be tasted, this is sweet; he who infers, therefore this ought to be tasted, necessarily tastes that sweet thing if there be no obstacle to hinder him.
For a conclusion of this argument from experience, let us compare the actions of inferior intelligent and sensible agents, and those of men together. It is allow'd that beasts are necessary agents, and yet there is no perceivable difference between their actions and the actions of men, from whence they should be deem'd necessary and men free agents. Sheep, for example, are suppos'd to be necessary agents, when they stand still,lie
- ↑ Ethica, l. 7, c. 5, ap. Opera Edit. Par. Vol. II. p. 88, &c.
