of chance is rendred possible; and this orderly world might have been produc’d by a disorderly or fortuitous concourse of atoms; or which is all one, by no cause at all. For in arguing against the Epicurean system of chance, do we not say, (and that justly) that it is impossible for chance ever to have produc’d an orderly system of things, as not being a cause suit’d to the effect; and that an orderly system of things, which had a beginning, must have had an intelligent Agent for its cause, as being the only proper cause to that effect? All which implies that causes are suited, or have relation to some particular effects, and not to others. And if they be suited to some particular effect and not to others, they can be no causes at all to those others. And therefore a cause not suited to the effect, and no cause; are the same thing. And if a cause not suited to the effect is no cause; then a cause suited to the effect is a necessary cause: for if it does not produce the effect, it is not suited to it, or is no cause at all of it.
Liberty therefore, or a power to act or not to act, to do this is another thing under the same causes, is an impossibility and atheistical.
