bable. The appearances of all propositions to us, whether evident, probable or improbable, are the sole rational grounds of our judgments in relation to them: and the appearances of probable or improbable propositions, are no less necessary in us from the respective reasons by which they appear probable or improbable, than are the appearances of evident propositions from the reasons by which they appear evident. Wherefore if it be rational and a perfection to be determin’d by an evident appearance, it is no less so to be determin’d by a probable or improbable appearance; and consequently an imperfection not to be so determin’d.
It is not only an absurdity, and by consequence an imperfection, not to be equally and necessarily determin’d in our respective judgments, by probable and improbable, as well as by evident appearances, which I have just now proved; but even not to be necessarily determin’d by probable appearances, would be a greater imperfection, than not to be necessarily determin’d by evident appearances: because almost all our actions are founded on the probable appear-
