finite things could not have been otherwise than they are: for what is infinitely wise or good cannot be alter’d, or made either better or worse. And he concludes that he must leave this difficulty without pretending to explain it, or answer the objections that arise against all the several ways by which Divines have endeavor’d to resolve it.
Again,[1] are not Angels and other heavenly beings esteem’d more perfect than men; because, having a clear insight into the nature of things, they are necessarily determin’d to judge right in relation to truth and falshood, and to chuse right in relation to good and evil, pleasure and pain; and also to act right in pursuance of their judgment and choice? And therefore would not man be more perfect than he is, if, by having a clear insight into the nature of things, he was necessarily determin’d to assent to truth only, to chuse only such objects as would make him happy, and to act accordingly?
Further, is not man more perfect, the more capable he is of conviction? And will he not be more capable of conviction, if he be necessarily determin’d in his assent by what seems a reason to him, and necessarily determin’d in hisassent
- ↑ Bramhall’s Works, p. 656, 695.
