The divine prescience supposes, that all things future will certainly exist in such time, such order, and with such circumstances, and not otherwise. For if any things future were contingent, or uncertain, or depended on the liberty of man, that is, might or might not happen; their certain existence could not be the object of the divine prescience: it being a contradiction to know that to be certain, which is not certain: and God himself could only guess at the existence of such things. And if the divine prescience supposes the certain existence of all things future, it supposes also the necessary existence of all things future; because God can fore-know their certain existence only, either as that existence is the effect of his decree, or as it depends on its own causes. If he fore-knows that existence, as it is the effect of his decree; his decree makes that existence necessary: for it implies a contradiction for an all-powerful being to decree anything which shall not necessarily come to pass. If he foreknows that existence as it depends on its own causes; that existence is no less necessa-
