Page:A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty (Foote).djvu/67

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HUMAN LIBERTY.
65

their designed effect two ways; first, by restraining or cutting off from society the vicious members; and secondly, by correcting men or terrifying them from the commission of those crimes. Now let punishments be inflicted with either of these views, it will be manifest that no regard is had to any free agency in man, in order to render those punishments just; but that on the contrary, punishments may be justly inflicted on man, though a necessary agent. For, first, if murderers for example, or any such vicious members are cut off from society, merely as they are public nuisances and unfit to live among men; it is plain they are in that case so far from being considered as free agents that they are cut off from society as a cankered branch is from a tree, or as a mad dog is killed in the streets. And the punishment of such men is just, as it takes mischievous members out of society. Also, for the same reason, furious madmen, whom all allow to be necessary agents, are in many places of the world either the objects of judicial punishments, or be allowed to be dispatched by private men. Nay, even men infected with the plague, who are not voluntary agents and are guilty of no crime, are sometimes thought to be justly cut off from society to prevent contagion from them.

Secondly, let punishments be inflicted on some criminals with a view to terrify, it will appear that in inflicting punishments with that view, no regard is had to any free agency in man in order to make those punishments just. To render the punishment of such men just, it is sufficient that they were voluntary agents, or had the will to do the crime for which they suffer, for the law very justly and rightly regardeth only the will, and no other preceding causes of action. For example, suppose the law, on pain of death, forbids theft, and there be a man who, by the strength of temptation, is necessitated to steal, and is thereupon put to death for it; doth not his punishment deter others from theft? Is it not a cause that others steal