suasion that his family were justly entitled to the throne, was every way natural, and we have already noticed, that hopes of their actually attaining to it were held out by Edward himself to the lord of Annandale. Nurtured and strengthened in such feeling, the young aspirant to royalty could not be expected to entertain attachment to the house of Baliol; and must have regarded with still greater aversion and distrust the sovereignty usurped by the power and stratagem of England over the rights and pretensions of all his race. During the struggle, therefore, of those contending interests—the independence of Scotland under Baliol, or its subjugation under Edward—he necessarily remained more in the situation of a neutral though deeply interested observer, than an active partisan; the success of either party involving in an almost indifferent degree the high claims, and, it might be, the existing fortunes of his house.
Taking these considerations into account, there is little difficulty in reconciling to itself the line of conduct which Bruce had hitherto pursued. By joining heartily with neither party, he prudently avoided committing the fortunes of his family to the hazard of utter destruction, and his right and influence could give, upon any emergency, a necessary and required preponderance to either side. He must have foreseen, too, with secret satisfaction, the consequences which would result to his own advantage from a contest in which the strength and resources of his rivals were mutually wasted, whilst his own energies remained entire, and ready on any favourable opportunity to be called decisively into action. That these were not exerted sooner, the existence of his father down to this period, and his submission to the English government, ma^ suggest a sufficient reason; and his own accession to the regency, in the name of the deposed Baliol, was a circumstance which could not but affect unfavourably, during its continuance, the assertion of his pretensions.
Meantime, while Bruce outwardly maintained the semblance of loyalty to Edward, he was not idle in secretly advancing the objects of his own ambition; and when actually engaged in assisting Edward in the settlement of the Scottish government, he entered into a secret bond of association with Lamberton bishop of St Andrews, whereby the parties became bound to aid each other against all persons whatever, and not to undertake any business of moment unless by mutual advice. No measure on the part of Bruce could be more politic than this was, of enlisting in his cause the power and influence of the church; and the reader may afterwards have occasion to remark that he owed his success more to their firm adherence to his interest, than to all the efforts of the nobility. Lamberton and his colleagues were more alarmed at the prospect of being subjected to the spiritual supremacy of York or Canterbury, than concerned for the temporal subjugation of their country; and thus, in the minds of the national clergy, the independency of the church became intimately associated with the more general cause of popular freedom. In addition to the spiritual power which Lamberton possessed, as head of the Scottish church, the effective aid which he could furnish by calling out the military retainers upon the church lands, was far from inconsiderable. Though we are not informed of any other similar contract to the above having been entered into between Bruce and his partizans, there can be little doubt that this was not the only one, and that he neglected no safe expedient to promote and facilitate the enterprize which he contemplated. Notwithstanding, however, all the prudent caution and foresight displayed in these preparatory measures, the better genius of Bruce would seem utterly to have deserted him at the very critical moment of his fortune when its guidance was most required.
Before entering upon the important event to which we have alluded, it will be necessary to state briefly the relative position of the two great parties in the
