of military store. To enable his troops in some measure to obtain supplies, he separated his whole column into six divisions, each a day's march distant from the others, and thus passing- through an uncultivated country destitute of roads, whose few inhabitants could give no assistance and could not be trusted, and harassed by the neighbourhood of a powerful enemy, he had to drag his artillery and a large park of ammunition to join the commander-in-chief, whose safety depended on his speedy approach. At Almaraz he endeavoured to discover some path which might guide him through the hills to Ciudad Rodrigo, but not finding one easily accessible, the jaded state of his few remaining horses compelled him to relinquish the attempt to cross these regions. On reaching Talavera, to the other evils with which he had to contend was added the folly or perfidy of the Spanish functionaries: the secretary at war recommended to him a method of passing through Madrid, which on consideration he found would have been the most likely of all methods to throw him into the hands of the French army. Resolving to make a last effort to obtain assistance from the nation for which the British troops were wasting their blood, he proceeded in person to Madrid; but the uncontrolled confusion of the Spanish government threw additional clouds on his prospects, and he found that the safety of his men must depend on their own efforts. Avoiding the path so heedlessly proposed, he passed Naval Carnero, and reached Escurial, where he halted to bring up his rear, and to obtain bullocks for dragging his artillery and ammunition. Having crossed the mountains on the sixth day after leaving Madrid, his situation became more melancholy, and he fell into deeper difficulties. He received the intelligence of additional disasters among the Spaniards; arid his scouts traced the vicinity of parties of the enemy. "The general's situation," says colonel Napier in his History of the Peninsular War, "was now truly embarrassing. If he fell back to the Guadarama, the army at Salamanca would be without ammunition or artillery. If he advanced, it must be by a flank march of three days, with a heavy convoy, over a flat country, and within a few hour's march of a very superior cavalry. If he delayed where he was, even for a few hours, the French on the side of Segovia might get between him and the pass of Guadarama, and then, attacked in front, flank, and rear, he would be reduced to the shameful necessity of abandoning his convoy and guns, to save his men in the mountains of Avila. A man of less intrepidity and calmness would have been ruined; but Hope, as enterprising as he was prudent, without any hesitation ordered the cavalry to throw out parties cautiously towards the French, and to maintain a confident front if the latter approached; then moving the infantry and guns from Villacastin, and the convoy from Espinosa, by cross roads to Avila, he continued his march day and night until they reached Peneranda: the cavalry covering this movement closed gradually to the left, and finally occupied Fontiveros on the 2nd of December."[1] Not without additional dangers from the vicinity of the enemy, to the number of ten thousand infantry, and two thousand cavalry, with forty guns, he at length reached Salamanca, and joined the commander-in-chief. He partook in the measures which the army thus recruited endeavoured to pursue, as a last effort of active hostility, passing with his division the Douro at Tordesillas, and directing his march upon Villepando. In the memorable retreat which followed these proceedings, he had a laborious and perilous duty to perform. He commanded the left wing at the battle of Corunna;—of his share in an event so frequently and minutely recorded it is scarcely necessary to give a detailed account. After the death of the commander-in-chief, and the wound which compelled Sir David Baird to retire from the field, general Hope was left with the honour and responsibility of the supreme
- ↑ Vol. i p. 437.
