tradition P betrays his dependence on J2; and (3) that J2 in turn is markedly dependent on Babylonian sources (see Urgesch. 463-496, and the summary on p. 491 f.). Even if all these observations be well founded, it is obvious that they fall far short of a demonstration of Bu.'s thesis. It is a plausible conjecture so long as we assume that little was written beyond what we have direct or indirect evidence of (ib. 4631); but when we realise how little is known of the diffusion of literary activity in ancient Israel, the presumption that J2 was the particular writer who threw the Hebrew cosmogony into shape becomes very slender indeed.
1. We are confronted at the outset by a troublesome
question of syntax which affects the sense of every member
of v.1. While all ancient Vns. and many moderns take the
verse as a complete sentence, others (following Rashi and
Ibn Ezra) treat it as a temporal clause, subordinate either
to v.3 (Rashi, and so most) or v.2 (Ibn Ezra, apparently).
On the latter view the verse will read: In the beginning of God's creating the heavens and the earth: (
Hebrew characters) being in
the const. state, followed by a clause as gen. (cf. Is. 291,
Hos. 12 etc.; and see G-K. § 130 d; Dav. § 25). In a note
below reasons are given for preferring this construction to
the other; but a decision is difficult, and in dealing with
1.—(Hebrew characters)] The form is probably contracted from (Hebrew characters) (cf. (Hebrew characters)),
and therefore not derived directly from (Hebrew characters). It signifies primarily the
first (or best) part of a thing: Gn. 1010 ('nucleus'), 493 ('first product'),
Dt. 3321, Am. 66 etc. (On its ritual sense as the first part of crops, etc.,
see Gray's note, Num. 226 ff.). From this it easily glides into a
temporal sense, as the first stage of a process or series of events: Ho.
910 ('in its first stage'), Dt. 1112 (of the year), Jb. 87 4019 (a man's life),
Is. 4610 (starting point of a series), etc. We. (Prol.6 386) has said
that Dt. 1112 is the earliest instance of the temporal sense; but the
distinction between 'first part' and 'temporal beginning' is so impalpable
that not much importance can be attached to the remark. It is
of more consequence to observe that at no period of the language does
the temporal sense go beyond the definition already given, viz. the
first stage of a process, either explicitly indicated or clearly implied.
That being so, the prevalent determinate construction becomes
intelligible. That in its ceremonial sense the word should be used
absolutely was to be expected (so Lv. 212 [Nu. 1812] Neh. 1244: with
these may be taken also Dt. 3321). In its temporal applications it is
always defined by gen. or suff. except in Is. 4610, where the antithesis
to (Hebrew characters) inevitably suggests the intervening series of which (Hebrew characters) is the
initial phase. It is therefore doubtful if (Hebrew characters) could be used of an absolute
beginning detached from its sequel, or of an indefinite past, like (Hebrew characters)
or (Hebrew characters) (see Is. 126, Gn. 133).—This brings us to the question of
