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believe that in a few years neither army or navy will be tolerated in this country. How long, may I ask, will you continue to spend £25,000,000 a-year on your soldiers and sailors after you have realised the fact that war would bring you to starvation point in six months? Our opponents charge us with
THE FAILURE OF OUR POLICY;
but, like everything else they charge us with, this is false. I do not mean to say that our policy has been everywhere completely successful. This would be, perhaps, saying too much—the luck of Polycrates has not always been ours, but that our policy has been most successful, far more successful than we had any right to expect, I do most fearlessly assert. I do not mean to say that the Commercial Treaty with France, that the bombardment of Alexandria, the destruction of Hick's army, the proclamation of the abandonment of the Soudan, the relief of Sinkat and Tokar, the battles of Teb and Tamanieb, our treaty with Abyssinia have each, in their way, been conspicuous successes; neither do I deny that the Suez Canal Treaty, the Congo Treaty, the Angra Pequena Treaty, the Ilbert Bill, the Mercantile Marine Bill, the Municipal Bill, the Half-Guinea Tokens Bill, or even the London Conference may not, at a first glance, on some critical minds, at least, leave the impression of a want of completeness and finality. But this, believe me, is only in imagination. In reality, I assure you each and all of them have far exceeded in their results our most sanguine expectations. But granted, which in all humility it is my pleasure to do, that in every case we have not been able to command complete success, does not that prove the extraordinary difficulties we have had to encounter? Is it not more noble to have deserved success than to have achieved it? And have we not deserved it? Have not our energy, our decision, our foresight, our unswerving purpose, our prompt action, our tender consideration for our friends and allies, earned for us, not only your admiration, but that of the world? (Loud cheers.) But suppose that our policy has not been universally successful,
WHO IS TO BLAME?
Supposing that even now, at the eleventh hour, we may be too late to rescue Gordon, whose fault is it? It is solely and entirely the fault of those whose execrable Imperial policy compelled us to employ Gordon. But for the sinister policy of Lord Beaconsfield and Lord Salisbury, we should have had no Dual Control. If we had had no Dual Control we should have never bombarded Alexandria, we should never have occupied Egypt, we should never have proclaimed the abondonment of the Soudan, and if we had not proclaimed the abandonment of the Soudan we should not have found ourselves compelled to send Gordon to Khartoum! I am sure you will agree with me that it is no exaggeration to say that it is the late Government who virtually are answerable for Gordon's peril, and it is we who deserve the honour of his release. What I would ask you to do, and what I know you will do, is to take these twenty different points I have referred to, and consider them, not one by one, not allowing yourself to suppose that one has partially failed here,
