post on the other side of the river with the usual guard of two companies of Sepoys, and the addition of a field-piece. On the 9th of the month the enemy made the sally at noon day. There were 300 Sepoys, 200 cavalry dismounted, and 200 more on their horses. The riders came round from the west, and crossing the river, kept galloping on this side the camp, but without venturing to pass the swamp; but the foot issuing from the north gate, which they had unbricked, advanced straight forward to the watering post. A shot had scarcely been fired, before the two companies of Sepoys, either from panic or spite, for Mahomed Issoof was a severe commander, abandoned him, and dispersed, all but ten men, with whom he retreated to a choultry, on an island in the river, to which they were followed by part of the enemy, whilst the rest seized the gun. Lieutenant Rumbold on the danger advanced with the company of Coffrees, and one of Sepoys, leaving the four other companies, and the field-pieces for the defence of the camp. He made his way good to the choultry, where he found the small party of defenders reduced to their last cartridge, having killed more than their own number of the enemy, who retreated as soon as the reinforcement came up. On the 11th of June, arrived the detachment from Tritchinopoly; when Rumbold mounted the eighteen pounder they had brought on the recovered post. It fired three days, until most of its ammunition was spent, but without being able to make a practicable breach; and in the mean time the enemy threw up a retrenchment with a deep ditch before the breach, and strengthened the ditch with palisades; so that nothing could be done by assault without more force. The presidency had foreseen this; and notwithstanding their other alarms, still continued intent on the reduction of Madura, as the most dangerous advantage of which the French were likely to get possession, if not immediately recovered; of which sense nothing could be a greater proof than their insufficient efforts; for the attempt required a complete army. They therefore left it to the discretion of Calliaud, to proceed again to the attack, with such a force as should not leave Tritchinopoly exposed again to too much risque. Some days passed in waiting the
