others in the province, as a jaghire, or pension for his expences without account. All these points were adjusted without dispute, or even the appearance of dissension; but it was still more necessary to settle the object of the present expedition. The Nabob's intention to remove Ramnarain, in order to give the government of Patna to one or other of his more immediate dependants, would inevitably be productive of long disturbance and confusion; for it could not be doubted that Ramnarain, knowing the Nabob's enmity to him, would, on the approach of the army, offer any terms to Sujah Dowlah for his assistance, unless prevented by assurances he could rely on, that it was not intended to displace him. Obnoxious as Clive knew the proposal would be, he made it; adding to the obvious arguments, the necessity to which the English troops might at any time during the campaign be reduced, by the arrival of a French force in the river, to return on sudden warning to defend Calcutta; when the Nabob and his army might be left fighting with their own enemies in Behar. He then, as before in the case of Ramramsing and Roydoolub, offered his mediation if necessary, promising to preserve every right of the Nabob's demands and authority. The Nabob again having no valid alternative to propose, consented that Clive should write a letter to Ramnarain, advising him to come and pay his respects to the Nabob on the road; and assuring him of safety and favour. All these material points being settled, it was resolved to march forward without delay. Thus ended the conference with seeming amity, but real grudge in the Nabob to Roydoolub and Clive, and not without suspicions in them of him.
On the 2d of January, three days after the conference, the army began to move from Rajahmahal. At the Nabob's request the English led the van. Roydoolub, with his, amounting to 10000 men, and the artillery of the government, followed next; and the Nabob with the main body, amounting to 40000, brought up the rear: each had their fleet of boats; and for the convenience of provisions and encampment, as well as to prevent the occasions of quarrel amongst the respective soldieries, it was agreed that the three divisions should always make their halts at the distance of one day's march from
