Page:A history of the military transactions of the British nation in Indostan.djvu/333

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Book IX.
TANJORE.
327

from which any could be procured through the perpetual interruptions of the Tanjorine cavalry and Colleries, precluded the hopes of any immediate supplies. On the 8th in the morning advices were received, that another engagement had passed between the two squadrons, immediately after which, the English anchored before Karical, where they were threatening a descent; but that no tidings had been obtained concerning the French squadron since the fight. This intelligence aggravated the general anxiety, as the distresses of the army in their present situation, could only be relieved from Karical; and Mr.Lally despairing of succeeding in the assault of the breach, summoned his council of war, in which, of 12 officers 10 were of opinion to raise the siege; but two, Saubinet, and Mr. D'Estaigne, advised the immediate assault, the success of which appeared to D'Estaigne indubitable; who added, that the city would furnish more ammunition than would be expended in the storm, and that he had no apprehensions the English would make a descent upon Karical, whilst the French squadron kept the sea. Doubtless both D'Estaigne and Saubinet knew the ditch was fordable, when they advised the assault; otherwise, in the state we have known it since, the approach would have been utterly impracticable. In consequence of the resolution to retreat, the sick and wounded were sent away on the same day under the escort of 150 Europeans, and dispositions were made to decamp on the night of the ensuing day, which was the 10th of the month; in the mean time the guns in the batteries were fired every now and then in order to keep the garrison in awe.

Monacjee soon received intelligence of the resolution to raise the siege, and imputed it to despondency; the detachment from Tritchinopoly arrived in the middle of the same night, and he proposed that they should march immediately with his own troops to attack the French camp by surprize, conformably to a scheme for which he had taken measures; but they were so much fatigued, that he deferred the interprize for 24 hours, until the morning of the 10th, during which the camp received no intelligence of this design, but remained in negligence and security, as before an enemy they despised, and supposed wishing their retreat too much to interrupt it.