not fully answer the purpose of a blockade, which was to reduce the town by famine; for, being five miles distant, the army was not sufficient to form a chain of posts in a curve of 15 miles from the sea-shore on the north to the sea-shore on the south of the town, close, or in all parts strong enough, to intercept every thing. The bound-hedge of Pondicherry sweeps from the north to the s. E. of the town, where it ceases on the bank of the river of Ariancopang, which in two arms, with an island between them, supplies the rest of the barrier to the south of the town. The area included by the hedge with the arms of the river, comprizes nearly seven square miles. This ground afforded pasture for a number of cattle, which, if unmolested, might, whilst the English army, remained at their present distance, supply the troops and inhabitants with porvisions for seveal months; and the daily consumption might be replaced by small convoys from without; so that the enemy could not be severely distressed, until pent within the bound-hedge, when its redoubts and other stations in possession of the English, would suffer nothing to remain abroad beyond the foot of the glacis, and even there not in quiet. These posts would likewise obstruct the introduction of supplies in the whole extent of the hedge, and the present stock would remain the principal reliance, until the French army should be sufficiently reinforced to recover them; but now that the Mysoreans were gone, no probabiltiy remained of any troops coming to the succour of the town, excepting from the sea. Nevertheless the English force was not yet sufficiently superior, even if in possession of the bound-hedge, to open trenches against the town; and if it had, the preparation, embarkation, and transport of the artillery and stores, which were all to come from Madrass, could not be accomplished before the setting-in of the monsoon, which at farthest might be expected in the middle of October. If the French fleet appeared before this time, the issue of the fight at sea would determine the future success of the siege; if not, their delay must arise from the want of force to cope with Mr. Stevens's squadron; and in this case, it was scarcely to be doubted that single ships, or more, would at any risque venture with relief
