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place within the United States in which slavery is prohibited, but to give effect to such rights acquired in a foreign country.
No court has more consistently adhered to correct principles on this subject than the supreme court of Louisiana, which has repeatedly held that the fact of a slave having been taken to France, or to any State where slavery or involuntary servitude was not tolerated, operated on the condition of the slave, so as to produce an immediate emancipation; and, as was said by the court in one case, "being free for one moment in France, it was not in the power of her former owner to reduce her again to slavery." Marie Louise v. Marot, 9 Louisiana, 473; Smith v Smith, 13 Louisiana, 441; Lunsford v. Coquillon, 14 Martin, 403; Josephine v. Poultney, 1 Louisiana Annual Hep. 329. Even the statute of Louisiana of 1846, establishing a contrary rule, has been refused any effect on persons who thus acquired a right to freedom before it was passed. Eugenie v. Prevail 2 Louisiana Annual Rep. 180. And Chief Justice Eustis, in 1847, in the case of a slave who had resided with her master in France two years, (a period exactly equal to that of Dred Scott's residence in Illinois, and also to that of his residence in the Territory,) after citing some of the earlier Louisiana cases, very clearly states the law thus: "It is contended that this case does not come within the principle of those cases, inasmuch as the defendant acquired no domicil in France, as his absence from Louisiana was but temporary, where his property remained and his business continued, and he never lost his original residence. We consider that the jurisprudence of this State has settled this question, which has been more than once the subject of discussion. We cannot expect that foreign nations will consent to the suspension of the operations of their fundamental laws, as to persons voluntarily sojourning within their jurisdiction for such a length of time. As to those thrown on foreign coasts by shipwreck, taking refuge from pirates, driven by overwhelming necessity, or perhaps those passing through a foreign territory on a lawful journey, their personal condition may remain unchanged; but this is the extent to which an immunity from the effect of the foreign law could be maintained under the laws of nations." Arsene v. Pigneguy, 2 Louisiana Annual Rep. 621.
The principal authority in support of the opposite view, is the opinion of Lord Stowell in the case of the Slave Grace, 2 Hagg. Adm. 94, and as that is the foundation of all
