Page:A memoir of Granville Sharp.djvu/89

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APPENDIX




NO. 1.

In Sharp's tract, on "the injustice and dangerous tendency of tolerating slavery," published in London, by Benjamin White, Fleet-street, 1769, after quoting York and Talbot's opinion of Jan. 14, 1729, he states, that thirty years prior to this opinion, in the case of Gallway versus Caddee, before Baron Thompson, at Guildhall, the slave was judged to be free, "from his first setting foot on English ground."

He records a similar judgment in 1732, in the case of De Penna, &c. versus Henriquez; and Lord Chief Justice Holt's prior decision, "that as soon as a negro comes into England, he becomes free"—"one may be a villain in England, but not a slave."

He cites the following glorious principles of law.

"The law favors liberty." Wood's Inst. B. 1, c. 1, p. 25. Coke's 1st Inst. B. 124, and 2d Inst. 42, 115.

"The law favoreth a man's person before his possessions." Noyes' Maxims, p. 6 and 7.

"Quoties dubia interpretatio libertatis est, secundum libertatem respondendum." Digest. Lib. 50, Tit. 17, Leg. 20. Whenever the question of liberty seems doubtful, the decision must be in favor of liberty.

"The inferior law must give place to the superior—man's laws to God's laws." Noye's Maxims. If, therefore, any statute be enacted contrary to these, it ought to be considered of no authority in the laws of England. Etiam si aliquod statutum esse editum contra eas (that is against the laws of God) nullius vigoris, in legibus Angliæ, censeri debet. (Pages 55, 56, of another tract, entitled "Just limitation of slavery.")

"Usage and custom, generally received, have the force of law." Hale's History of Common Law, p. 65.

"Quia consuetudo, ex certa causa rationabile usitata, privat communem legem;" because custom, derived from a certain reasonable cause, takes the place of law. Littleton, Lib. 2, c. 10, sec. 149.