BATTLE OF WINCHESTER.
97
but attribute my escape from utter annihilation to the incapacity of my opponent.[1]
- ↑ The enemy has called this battle, "The Battle of the Opeqnon," but I know no claim it has to that title, unless it be in the fact that, after his repulse in the fore part of the day, some of his troops ran back across that stream. I have always thought that instead of being promoted, Sheridan ought to have been cashiered for this battle. He seems to be a sort of pet of Grant's, and I give the following extracts from the report of the latter, to show the strange inconsistency of which he is guilty to magnify Sheridan's services. In hi- Monocacy letter to Hunter, Grant says: "From Harp"r's Ferry if it is found that the enemy has moved north of the Potomac in large force, push north following him and attacking him wherever found; follow him if driven south of the Potomac as long as it is safe to do so. If it is ascertained that the enemy has but a small force north of the Potomac, then push south with the main force, detaching under a competent commander, a sufficient force to look after the raiders and drive them to their homes." And further on in the same letter, he says: "Bear in mind the object is to drive the enemy south, and to do this, you want to keep him always in sight. Be guided in your course by the course he takes." When Sheridan relieved Hunter, this letter of instructions was ordered to be turned over to him, and two divisions of cavalry subsequently joined him ; yet Grant says in regard to Sheridan’s operations: "His operations during the month of August and the fore part of September, were both of an offensive and defensive character, resulting; in many severe skirmishes, principally by the cavalry, in which we were generally successful, but no general engagement took place. The two armies lay in such a position, the enemy on the west bank of the Opequon Creek covering Winchester, and our forces in front of Berryville—that either could bring on a battle at any time. Defeat to us would open to the enemy the states of Maryland and Pennsylvania for long distances before another army could be interposed to check him. Under these circumstances, I hesitated about allowing the initiative to be taken. Finally the use of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad and the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, which were both obstructed by the enemy, became so indispensablly necessary to us, and the importance of relieving Pennsylvania and Maryland from continuously threatened invasion so great, that I determined the risk should be taken. But fearing to telegraph the order for an attack without knowing more than I did of Gen. Sheridan's feelings as to what would be the probable result, I left City Point on the 15th of September to visit him at his headquarters, to decide after conference with him what should be done. I met him at Charlestown, and he pointed out so directly how each army lay. what he would do the moment he was authorized, and expressed such confidence of success that I saw there were but two words of instruction necessary—go in." In the lteter to Hunter there is no hesitation about the initiative, and yet, notwithstanding this letter was turned over to Sheridan for his guidance, and two divisions of cavalry subsequently sent to him, and the further fact that he had been operating both on the offensive and defensive, during August and the fore part of September, the impression is sought to be made, that his ardour was restrained by some sort of orders, of which no mention is made in Grant's report. Really this is very curious, and
