retains for some time the accused against whom there are very strong proofs, but insufficient to condemn him; in the hope of acquiring new light one does not place him immediately in the midst of his fellow citizens, who would not see him again without great alarm. But the arbitrariness of this measure and the abuse which one can make of it have caused its rejection in the countries where one attaches the greatest price to individual liberty.
Now what is the probability that the decision of a tribunal which can condemn only by a given majority will be just, that is to say, conform to the true solution of the question proposed above? This important problem well solved will give the means of comparing among themselves the different tribunals. The majority of a single vote in a numerous tribunal indicates that the affair in question is very doubtful; the condemnation of the accused would be then contrary to the principles of humanity, protectors of innocence. The unanimity of the judges would give very strong probability of a just decision; but in abstaining from it too many guilty ones would be acquitted. It is necessary, then, either to limit the number of judges, if one wishes that they should be unanimous, or increase the majority necessary for a condemnation, when the tribunal becomes more numerous. I shall attempt to apply calculus to this subject, being persuaded that it is always the best guide when one bases it upon the data which common sense suggests to us.
The probability that the opinion of each judge is just enters as the principal element into this calculation. If in a tribunal of a thousand and one judges, five
