Page:A series of intercepted letters in Mexico.djvu/12

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in the whole of his operations in this country, has been to bring about an honorable peace, he gave out, in advance, before he left Puebla, precisely what he would do before he would, by force of arms, enter the capital.

The Mexican army being so large, and its appointments so complete, while the fortifications, which astonish all who see them, were constructed with scientific skill—all these facts made it necessary for Gen. Scott to move from Puebla and strike a severe blow near the capital, as the only means of convincing the Mexicans that, notwithstanding all their preparations, they could not resist the American army, small as it was. There was some hope that by thus opening the eyes of the Mexican people in the capital, negotiations might be entered upon, and a peace secured; to accomplish which important object Gen. Scott was willing to forego all the eclat of a forcible entrance into the capital. We know that all this was distinctly within the contemplation of Gen. Scott before he put foot in the stirrup to leave the city of Puebla. His foresight and deliberate plan, in this respect, is one of the most remarkable incidents, all things considered, that has ever occurred in the history of wars. Let his position be considered—his distance from home—the extent of his march to Puebla—the distance yet to be overcome—the smallness of his force—the character of the city to be assailed, the great capital of a great country, defended by an army full three times his numbers, and known to be so—that capital surrounded by lakes or swamps, and only to be approached by narrow causeways, with deep ditches on either side, and swept by artillery in front and in flank. In view of all this, Gen. Scott said, before he left Puebla, in so many words, that he would march to the neighborhood of the capital, and either defeat the Mexican army in the open field if they would give him battle; or he would take a strong position from the enemy, and then, if he could restrain the enthusiasm of his army, he would pause without the city, and summon it to surrender, in order to give the authorities within the city an opportunity and a motive (the safety of the capital,) for making a peace. He did precisely what he designed. He marched from Puebla in four columns, with the interval of a day's march between each two columns, and arrived himself, being with the leading column, at Ayotla, before the Penon, on the 11th of August.

While the rear was coming up, he reconnoitered the Penon and country around, and satisfied himself of the practicability of a march by the way of Chalco to San Augustin. As the rear columns came up they were directed towards Chalco, and taking up that route himself, the General went to San Augus-