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wherever he could be found. I give you this news in time, that you may advise his friends.
The action, of which the above is a brief account, although a partial one, and very costly to the enemy, owing to the number they lost, was still a decisive one, as I shall explain.
Soon after Santa Anna returned to Churubusco, he heard the news of the route of Valencia, and as he thereby lost the only point which could protect San Antonio, he ordered that place to be abandoned, but without doubt, there was not one among our generals who knew how to direct this difficult operation, not even Santa Anna himself, whose head is not inventive.
Note.—When Valencia's camp was forced, the passage to San Angel was open, and thus San Antonio was turned by its right.
I had forgotten to tell you, and it is necessary for you to know it, that Coapa was the general headquarters of the Americans, that is to say, half a league from San Antonio, a place which the enemy occupied with tranquility, notwithstanding the fire of our heavy artillery.
From Coapa the enemy could easily perceive without glasses our movement at San Antonio, and attack us in our retreat.
Well, then, after Santa Anna heard the news of the rout of Valencia, he ordered the troops at San Antonio to retire and sustain Churubusco, and also ordered the brigade which had left San Angel in the morning for Mexico to return and defend the bridge. (Note.—There was here a regular tete-de-pont, according to the best principles of fortification.) The first part of the order was executed at San Antonio, some of the guns there being spiked and abandoned. This movement was observed by the Americans, who had not up to this moment moved from their position; but when they observed our troops retire, and some confusion in our camp, and understood our design, they ordered a column to pass by the way of the Pedregal, and cut off our retreat. At the Pedregal, they met some of the victorious troops from Valencia's camp, passing by San Angel with the same object. Then, although many of our troops, including our best battallions of national guards, wished to engage in battle, there being much enthusiasm among them, still the principal officers in charge of this retreat, would not allow them to fire, but urged their retreat, by a forced march—the enemy being on their left without firing, which circumstance we cannot understand, as they could have cut up our troops, the Hidalgo and Victoria national guards.
