Page:Adams ex rel. Kasper v. School Board of St. Johns County, Florida (2018).pdf/33

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Case 3:17-cv-00739-TJC-JBT Document 192 Filed 07/26/18 Page 33 of 70 PageID 10711

Civil Cases, Eleventh Circuit (2013 revision, last revised Jan. 2018) 1.1 Gen. Prelim. Instr.; Texas Dep’t of Comm. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) (explaining that even in burden shifting cases, plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact).

The Supreme Court has long recognized that the state has broad authority to protect the physical, mental, and moral well-being of its youth. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 72–74 (1976). The Court is mindful that schools are traditionally locally controlled and that a federal court should tread lightly when asked to contravene a policy established by a local school board. Minor children are involved here and the concerns of their parents and school administrators charged with their safety cannot be minimized. Moreover, of all the areas in a school, bathrooms are where privacy considerations are at their peak. So, even if a school is otherwise prepared to accept a student as transgender, it is not surprising that allowing transgender students to use restrooms aligned with their gender identity is not an easy step. But neither was it easy when public restrooms were racially integrated. To be sure, what the law requires and what some are comfortable with are not always the same. Nonetheless, “[a]n individual can invoke a right to constitutional protection when he or she is harmed, even if the broader public


    to “restrooms” or “bathrooms” within this section of the opinion do not include those located in the locker room or shower facilities.

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