sister's children, the widower must marry her: there is no other alternative.
This, we know, is exactly what some would desire. But are they the majority? are they the kind of persons most to be considered? The law, so far as it respects persons at all, should take most care of those who can least take care of themselves. Suppose then two widowed husbands: call the one Viduus, the other Polygamus. Polygamus wants to marry his wife's sister, Viduus feels that he never can marry again, but looks to be helped and comforted by his sister-in-law's care of his children. If the law is changed, Polygamus will be favoured, greatly to the detriment of Viduus. Why should it be so? Who can prove that there are more of the first sort than of the second? And if there were, why should they be more considered? It is no disrespect to Polygamus to conjecture, that he may and would overcome his attachment, if all law were clearly against it, and would soon make himself very happy with some other person. But to Viduus and his children the loss is, humanly speaking, irreparable.
If you say that even as things are, Viduus will find it a difficult and delicate matter to
