Cite as 344 Ark. 627 (2001)
decision below insofar as it affirmed a blanket invalidation of Amendment 68. The Court noted that in such a preemption case, state law is displaced only "'to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law.'" Id. (citing Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conserv. & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983); Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Assn., 505 U.S. 88, 109 (1992); and Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 376 (1986). "'[T]he rule [is] that a federal court should not extend its invalidation of a statute further than necessary to dispose of the case before it.'" Id. (quoting Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 502 (1985).
[4] Accordingly, the import of Amendment 68 remains a compelling expression of Arkansas's public policy "to the extent" it does not violate federal law. Ark. Const. amend. 68, § 2. By federal constitutional interpretation, the state's interest in protecting the life of a fetus begins at viability. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality) (holding that a state may promote its interest in the potentiality of human life subsequent to viability, even by regulating or proscribing abortion); Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (holding that viability is the point when the independent existence of a fetus can be the object of state protection).
[5] Our decision in Chatelain was premised upon avoiding inconsistency. Chatelain, 322 Ark. at 525, 910 S.W.2d at 219. Now, to be consistent with the current expression of legislative intent,[1] we must depart from Chatelain. As a general rule, we are bound to follow prior case law under the doctrine of stare decisis, a policy designed to lend predictability and stability to the law. State Office of Child Support Enforcem't v. Mitchell, 330 Ark. 338, 343, 954 S.W.2d 907 (1997) (citing Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 1252, 429 S.W.2d 45, 52 (1968) (superseded by statute on other grounds)). Indeed, it is well-settled that "[p]recedent governs until it gives a result so patently wrong, so manifestly unjust, that a break becomes unavoidable." Mitchell, 330 Ark. at 343 (quoting Parish, 244 Ark. at 1252). Our test is whether adherence to the rule would result in "great injury or injustice." Mitchell, 330 Ark. at 343 (quoting Independence Fed. Bank v. Webber, 302 Ark. 324, 331, 789 S.W.2d 725, 730 (1990)). Here, we must conclude that the expressed public policy of the General Assembly justifies a break from precedent. Accordingly,
- ↑ Significantly, following the submission of this appeal, the legislature amended Ark. Code Ann. section 16-62-102(a) to include viable fetus in the definition of person for wrongful-death actions. See Act 1265 of 2001 (approved April 4, 2001). The legislature also designated a deceased viable fetus a decedent for purposes of the probate code. See Act 1775 of 2001 (approved April 18, 2001).
