Opinion of KENNEDY, J.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 132, Orig.
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STATE OF ALABAMA, STATE OF FLORIDA, STATE OF TENNESSEE, COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, AND SOUTHEAST INTERSTATE LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT COMMISSION, PLAINTIFFS v. STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
ON EXCEPTIONS TO THE PRELIMINARY AND SECOND REPORTS OF THE SPECIAL MASTER
[June 1, 2010]
JUSTICE KENNEDY, with whom JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR joins, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
The Court is correct, in my view, to conclude that we may not “add provisions to a federal statute.” Ante, at 20. Plaintiffs do not request as much, however, in contending that North Carolina was required by the Compact to carry out its obligations in good faith. Rather, plaintiffs’ argument is that the Compact’s terms, properly construed, speak not only to the specific duties imposed upon the parties but also to the manner in which those duties must be carried out. This is an interpretive argument familiar to contract disputes. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts §205 (1979) (hereinafter Restatement).
As the opinion for the Court notes, congressional consent to an interstate compact gives it the status of a federal statute. See ante, at 20. This is an apt and proper way to indicate that a compact has all the dignity of an Act of Congress. And that is surely what was meant in New Jersey v. New York, 523 U. S. 767, 811 (1998), where it was stated that the Court may not “ ‘order relief inconsistent with [the] express terms’ ” of a compact. Ante, at 20 (quoting New Jersey; alteration in original; some inter-
