not preempted because "[t]he statutory provisions create and impose duties on an employer independent of a CBA."[1]By contrast, the Washington statute at issue in this case creates a dutyconditioned and dependent on the collective bargaining agreement.
Preemption of course does not mean that Masserant was not entitled to use her December vacation time in May to care for her son. All it means is that the question whether she could use her vacation leave in advance of her scheduled time for this purpose is to be determined by the dispute resolution process in the collective bargaining agreement, not by the state claim resolution process. All we decide is which dispute resolution process must be used, not what result it must reach.
The district court erred by rejecting preemption. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for appropriate resolution so that the dispute can be resolved by the process established in the collective bargaining agreement.
REVERSED AND REMANDED
CHRISTEN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
The district court recognized that the underlying issue in Masserant’s claim is not what benefits the collective bargaining agreement provides, it is whether the terms of the parties’ CBA violate the Washington Family Care Act. Masserant argues that the WFCA creates “non-negotiable
- ↑ Id. at 1041.
