preempted by LMRA § 301. Id. The right to payment and the timeliness of the payments were addressed by the CBA, but we concluded the claim for failure to tender payment within twenty-four hours was not preempted because "whether a violation has occurred is controlled only by the provisions of the state statute and does not turn on whether the payment was timely under the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement." Id. at 1111; see also Valles v. Ivy Hill Corp., 410 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding claim was not preempted where it was based on a statutorily guaranteed right to work-free meal periods).
Like the rights at issue in Livadas, Kobold, and Balcorta, if Masserant has the right to use her vacation time for family leave, it arises from a state statute, here, the WFCA, and not from the parties' CBA.
B. The right Masserant asserts is not substantially dependent on analysis of the CBA.
The second step of the Burnside analysis requires a "determin[ation] whether a state law right is ‘substantially dependent’ on the terms of a CBA.”[1]Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1060 (citation omitted). To apply this part of the test, a court must “decide whether the claim can be resolved by ‘look[ing] to’ versus interpreting the CBA.” Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted). The line between “looking to” and “interpreting” is sometimes less than clear-cut, but “‘when the meaning of contract terms is not the subject of dispute,
- ↑ Although the majority analyzes Masserant’s claim in the context of Burnside’s step two, it ultimately relies on step one to conclude that Masserant’s claim is preempted.
