out the details with the commanding general of the 1st Cavalry Division, Major General John Norton, and General Nguyen Van Hieu of the 22d Vietnam Division, with headquarters in Qui Nhon.
The tactical agreement among the three division commanders was that at a given time the 1st Cavalry Division would move north out of An Khe and then, in a southerly sweep of the area north of Phu Cat Mountain, pin down the area and search it for any enemy activity involving the 2d Viet Cong Regiment, the 18th North Vietnamese Regiment, and portions of the 22d North Vietnamese Regiment, all under the command of the North Vietnam 3d Division with headquarters north of Bong Son. The Koreans would move north, sweeping all of Phu Cat Mountain, and occupy the strip along the ocean north of the mountain while elements of the 22d Vietnamese Division would move between the Koreans and U.S. troops from Highway 1 toward the sea.
In a succession of rapid movements up Phu Cat Mountain, the Koreans rapidly occupied key points of the terrain and in a matter of a few days had completely dominated an area occupied by at least two North Vietnamese battalions. The drive on Phu Cat Mountain by the Korean forces was extraordinarily thorough and effective. The count of captured weapons alone amounted to more than 600 rifles.
By the end of 1965 the Korean corps under General Chae, who had been promoted from commanding general of the Capital Division to commander of the corps, had assumed responsibility all the way from Phu Cat Mountain down to Phan Rang. The tactical area of operations included the mission of protecting all the populated area on each side of Highway 1. With the exception of the northern third of Phu Yen Province between the northernmost brigade of the Korean 9th Division in Tuy Hoa and the Capital Division in Binh Dinh Province, where the 1st Brigade of the U.S. 101st and elements of the U.S. 4th Division were brought in to fill the gap in early and mid-1966, the entire area had become the responsibility of the Koreans, working in conjunction with the South Vietnamese Army whenever they were in the same area.
Another example of the Koreans' capability in small unit tactics was the co-ordination between I Field Force headquarters and General Chae that provided a Korean battalion in the Central Highlands to work with the U.S. 4th Infantry Division south of Highway 19, just east of the Cambodian border. When the battalion arrived it was divided into three separate company
