appraisal of the Korean forces appears to be essentially the same as the U.S. evaluation. The Koreans had much in common with the Vietnamese public in areas where they were stationed because of the common village origin of the Korean soldier and the Vietnamese peasant, the common rice economy of the two countries, and their similarities in religion and rural culture.
The Koreans remained independent and administratively autonomous. In handling disciplinary matters arising with Vietnamese citizens and the Vietnam government, for example, the Koreans used their own military police and accepted full responsibility for their troops. They handled untoward incidents independently. Military police courtesy patrols in areas of overlapping American, Vietnamese, and Korean responsibility were formed with representatives of each of the three countries.
The size of the Korean force was determined piecemeal and was based solely on what the United States thought was possible from the Korean point of view and on what the United States was willing to pay. Military requirements had very little to do with it. The United States negotiated first for a one-division force. After it was in Vietnam, completely new negotiations to increase the force to a two-division-plus corps were begun. With the second negotiations, the cost to the United States went up, with the Koreans trying to get the maximum out of the Americans. Each major unit was considered separately.
In summary, a formal agreement on the use and employment of the Koreans did not exist. At first General Westmoreland told the I Field Force Commander the Koreans would be under his control. The Capital Division commander, General Chae, on his first visit to I Field Force made clear that he did not consider himself under U.S. control. After the second Korean division and the Marine brigade arrived and a Korean corps took over, with General Chae commanding, the Koreans were independent of I Field Force. Operations, however, were co-ordinated in an amiable spirit. The Koreans had specified their desire to be deployed in a significant, prestigious area, on the densely populated coast, where the Korean presence would have the greatest impact at home and abroad. The Koreans were also under instructions to avoid heavy casualties.
President Park, during his visit to the Republic of Vietnam, had told General Westmoreland that he was proud to have Koreans fight under Westmoreland's command. This verbal statement was as far as any admission of subordination of Korean forces to U.S. command ever went. General Westmoreland told the commander of I Field Force to work out an arrangement on
