Following Operation OH JAC KYO in July 1967 the Korean 9th and Capital Divisions thwarted enemy intentions to go on the offensive in Phu Yen Province by inflicting large troop and equipment losses primarily on the North Vietnamese 95th Regiment. Operation HONG KIL DONG alone accounted for 408 enemy killed and a kill ratio of 15 to 1 between 9 and 31 July. By the time the operation was terminated on 28 August, in order to provide security for the coming elections, the total enemy killed had reached 638 and the kill ratio was 24 to 1. In addition, some 98 crew-served and 359 individual weapons had been captured.
In the last four months of 1967, however, no major Korean Army operations were undertaken. This was due partly to the need to provide security for the South Vietnamese elections of September in the face of increased enemy attempts to thwart those elections and partly to the need to keep more than 350 kilometers of Highways 1 and 19 "green." Small unit actions continued to be numerous.
During 1968 the pattern of Korean operations did not change materially from that of previous years; the Korean troops continued to engage in extensive small unit actions, ambushes, and battalion and multibattalion search and destroy operations within or close to their tactical areas of responsibility. Over-all these operations were quite successful. An analysis of an action by Korean Capital Division forces during the period 23—29 January 1968 clearly illustrates the Korean technique. After contact with an enemy force near Phu Cat, the Koreans "reacting swiftly... deployed six companies in an encircling maneuver and trapped the enemy force in their cordon. The Korean troops gradually tightened the circle, fighting the enemy during the day and maintaining their tight cordon at night, thus preventing the enemy's escape. At the conclusion of the sixth day of fighting, 278 NVA had been KIA with the loss of just 11 Koreans, a kill ratio of 25.3 to 1."
Later in 1968 a Korean 9th Division operation titled BAEK MA 9 commenced on 11 October and ended on 4 November with 382 enemy soldiers killed and the North Vietnamese 7th Battalion, 18th Regiment, rendered ineffective. During this operation, on 25 October, the eighteenth anniversary of the division, 204 of the enemy were killed without the loss of a single Korean soldier.
By and large, however, the Korean Army continued to stress small unit operations. In its operational assessment for the final quarter of calendar year 1968, the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Quarterly Evaluation states:
As the quarter ended Allied forces in II CTZ were conducting ex[tensive]
