and exploited for information of immediate tactical value. Civilians were segregated according to age and sex. Women and children were usually interrogated in two separate groups. Men were questioned individually. The Koreans used rewards routinely to elicit information. They fed and provided medical attention to those people from whom they sought information. They also used bribes of food, money, candy, and cigarettes to soften the more likely subjects (women and children).
Detainees were a valuable source of information. They were retained in one central area until the Koreans were convinced they had been properly exploited. There was no rush to release the people to return to their homes, the theory being that if held long enough they would provide the desired information. The villagers themselves were employed to point out Viet Cong dwellings and the location of weapons, booby traps, and enemy equipment.
Ambushes
The usual ambush force was a squad, reinforced with one or more machine guns. An on-line formation was used with the automatic weapons on the flanks, about twenty meters off the selected trail. The position had been thoroughly reconnoitered before dark and was occupied at last light or in darkness. All unnecessary equipment was left at the company base. Faces were blackened and all equipment carried was taped or tied down.
Ambush sites were not altered by cutting fields of fire or by digging in. Absolute light and noise discipline was maintained. Until contact was made, communication between squad members was accomplished through rugs on a length of rope or radio wire, strung between positions. No firing was permitted until the enemy was well within the killing zone. Troops in the ambush force remained quiet and awake throughout the period of ambush, be it all day or all night. All individuals appeared to remain awake and alert with no help from squad leaders.
In summary, the factors contributing to the success of Korean forces were the following: discipline, aggressiveness, training, patience, and physical fitness of the Korean soldiers; outstanding leadership; adherence to the same tactical doctrine taught at U.S. service schools and written in U.S. manuals; thorough planning; careful initial reconnaissance; time taken to develop tactical situations; sealing and blocking of selected areas prior to entrance; use of interpreters at company level (interpreters were the product of division school training).
The criteria listed above should not suggest that the Koreans
