[nation]al headquarters would stand between the unit commander and the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, or Commander in Chief, Vietnam Armed Forces.
In separate meetings later in April with Australian and Vietnamese government officials, the issue of a combined staff was again discussed. At a conference on 28 April, General Westmoreland told General Nguyen Van Thieu and Major General Duong Van Minh that the first mission of Free World forces would be to furnish base security in order to release Vietnamese troops from such tasks; patrols would then be sent outside base areas in co-ordination with Vietnam commanders. Though General Minh had previously favored the combined staff concept, he now stated that he would prefer to have the MACV International Military Assistance Office provide the necessary staff mechanism. The proposal was to be studied further.
Meeting the following day with the Australian Ambassador to South Vietnam, General Westmoreland again broached the question of command arrangements. Pending further guidance, the ambassador was unprepared to say whether it would be possible to incorporate Australian forces with other Free World troops into an international military security task force but indicated his government had been thinking of brigading the Australian battalion with a U.S. unit rather than put the battalion out on its own. The Australian Ambassador was also notified that the MACV International Military Assistance Office was visualized as the staff mechanism for solving problems between the government of Vietnam and Free World forces.
The Korean government, not wanting to have the only Free World combat forces besides the U.S. forces in South Vietnam, expressed the fear that its aid might be seen not as independently and freely given but as the fulfillment of the obligation of a vassal state. These misgivings caused the United States to weigh more carefully the pros and cons of obtaining Korean combat troops before again asking the government of Vietnam to approach the Republic of Korea for combat troops.
On 15 April word had come from Washington that more U.S. troops would definitely be sent because deteriorating conditions in South Vietnam warranted it, and there had not been a negative reaction to the earlier deployments. Ambassador Taylor was somewhat taken aback by this development. During his recent visit to Washington, 28 March-5 April, he had felt that the President was exercising caution and restraint on the subject of possible troop deployments. But after President Johnson's 7 April speech at Johns Hopkins he had noticed that the cables
