Page:Allied Participation in Vietnam.pdf/37

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THE BACKGROUND, 1961-1966
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Table 1–Strength of Free World Military Assistance Forces 1964-1970
Country 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
Australia
Strength 200 1,557 4,525 6,818 7,661 7,672 6,703
Number of maneuver battalions 1 2 2 3 3 3
Korea
Strength 200 20,620 45,500 47,829 50,000 48,060 48,717
Number of maneuver battalions 10 22 22 22 22 22
Thailand
Strength 0 16 244 2,205 6,005 11,568 11,586
Number of maneuver battalions 0 0 1 3 6 6
New Zealand
Strength 50 110 155 514 516 552 441
The Philippines
Strength 17 72 2,063 2,020 1,576 189 74
Republic of China
Strength 20 20 23 31 29 29 51
Spain
Strength 0 0 13 13 12 10 7
Total strength 467 22,404 52,166 59,450 63,602 65,889 67,444
Total maneuver battalions 0 11 24 24 26 33 51


[sup]port elements, all of which would have made a welcome addition to the allied effort. There were, however, several important factors to be considered in using Gurkha units in South Vietnam. Besides American antipathy toward the use of mercenaries, there was the possibility that the Gurkhas would be reluctant to serve under other than British leadership. Further, employing Gurkhas in South Vietnam could become the focal point of a new Communist propaganda campaign.

If the Gurkhas were made available, General Westmoreland's concept of employment was to use the brigade on operations similar to those it had been conducting. The principal advantage of having the brigade would be the addition of highly trained and disciplined troops, experienced in counterguerrilla operations. All questions, however, became moot when the United Kingdom decided not to phase out the Gurkha Brigade before 1969. At that time British defense policy and troop requirements beyond 1969 would be reviewed.