[dif]ferent from waiting for a conflagration to spread and reach our house, not taking any action to help put it out. That is why we must take action to help put out this conflagration, even being willing to run any risk to stave off disaster. We must not risk the lives of our people, including babies, or run the risk of having to evacuate them from their homes, causing untold hardship to all the people, everywhere. Food will be scarce and very high-priced.
It is therefore most proper and suitable in every way for us to send combat forces to fight shoulder-to-shoulder with other countries in opposition to aggression, especially at a time when that aggression is still far away from our country. This is a decision reached that is most proper and suitable, when considered from a military, a political and an economic angle.
This decision led to a number of problems for the United States. The first was the amount of logistical support to be given Thailand. The United States assumed that the Thai unit would resemble the one proposed, that is, a group of about 1,000 men, organized into infantry, artillery, armored car, and quartermaster elements, and able to fight independently of other supporting forces. Assurances had been given to the Thai Prime Minister that support for the force would be in addition to support for the Thai forces in Thailand, and would be similar to that given the Thai forces already in South Vietnam. These assurances were an essential part of the Thai decision to deploy additional troops. Thus the Department of Defense authorized service funding support for equipment and facilities used by Thai units in South Vietnam, and for overseas allowances, within the guidelines established for support of the Koreans. Death gratuities were payable by the United States and no undue economic burden was to be imposed on the contributing nation.
With the Thai troop proposal now in motion, the Commander in Chief, Pacific, felt that U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, and U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand, should begin discussions on organization, training, equipment, and other support problems pertaining to the deployment of the Thai unit. The U.S. Embassy in Bangkok, however, was of a different mind. The ambassador pointed out that General Westmoreland had asked for a regimental combat team. This request had been seconded by the Commander in Chief, Pacific, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. The ambassador said he still hoped to obtain a regimental-size unit bud did not believe negotiations had reached the stage where detailed discussions as suggested by the Commander in Chief, Pacific, should be undertaken.
In the meantime representatives of the Vietnam and Thai military assistance commands met and held discussions
