squadron and helicopter units. The unit was meanwhile assembling. On 1 June 650 officers and enlisted men began training at Fort Magsaysay while at other military areas groups of volunteers were awaiting transportation to Fort Magsaysay.
In the original planning the Philippine Civic Action Group had anticipated deploying approximately 120 days after the Philippine Congress passed the bill. This figure was based on a 60-day period for transport of the group's engineer equipment to the Philippines, including 15 days for deprocessing and movement to a training area, 45 days of training with the equipment, and 15 days for processing and transporting the unit to Vietnam. President Marcos, unhappy about the lengthy lead time required for the departure of his troops, felt that opponents of the bill could continue their opposition as long as the troops remained in the Philippines. In response, the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, pointed out that the deployment date could be moved up considerably if the training equipment could be made available in less than the 45 days scheduled, but apparently this was not possible. A Joint Chiefs of Staff proposal that the Philippine Civic Action Group, Vietnam, conduct all individual and unit training in South Vietnam MACV considered infeasible. MACV pointed out that if an untrained unit was deployed to Vietnam, U.S. or Free World tactical forces would be obliged to provide security forces at a time when they would be otherwise committed to tactical operations. In addition, if an inadequately trained Philippine civic action group was attacked and did sustain significant casualties, the far-reaching political implications could adversely affect both the Philippine and the United States governments. An alternate proposal made by the Commander in Chief, Pacific, was that an advance planning group be sent, to arrive within 30 days following passage of the bill, with the advance party to arrive within a 60-day period and the main body at the end of 90 days. This proposal was believed to have merit, but only if it was absolutely necessary to deploy the Philippine group earlier than planned. Recognizing the importance of the training, President Marcos accepted the four-month timetable.
In the course of their training, the Filipinos were assisted by two U.S. mobile training teams. One team from the United States Army, Vietnam, assisted in training with M16 rifles and tactics peculiar to operations in South Vietnam. A second team from the U.S. Eighth Army in Korea conducted training on M113 driving and maintenance. During the training period in the Philippines, the Philippine group experienced some difficul[ties]
