suitable means of safeguarding Germany against every conflict with her western neighbor. In truth, the Austro-German treaty did not prevent France from allying herself with Russia against Germany. It was necessary to forestall such an alliance, to secure from Russia that she should remain neutral in case of attack upon Germany or Austria. An agreement between the three emperors was arranged, and the document embodying it was signed on June 6/18, 1881, by Saburov, Bismarck, and Széchenyi.
The first article of this treaty was thus expressed:
In case one of the three powers should find itself at war with a fourth great power, the other two will preserve a benevolent neutrality toward it, and will devote their efforts to the localizing of the conflict.
This stipulation shall also apply to a war between one of the three powers and Turkey, but only in case a previous agreement has been arranged between the three courts relative to the results of that war.
In the special case that one of them shall have obtained from one of its two allies a more positive assistance, the obligation of the present article shall continue in full force for the third.
This agreement was concluded for a period of three years. Well in advance of its expiration, the minister of foreign affairs called together a council at Moscow, on May 20, 1883, to deliberate on the question whether reasons of state required a renewal of this treaty. Mr. Peter Saburov, ambassador of Russia at Berlin, held that this entente was more advantageous to Germany than to Russia. Three years before, it was sufficient for the needs of the moment; now, it was no longer capable of securing Russian interests. The first article, while leaving to Germany entire freedom of action in the West, conditioned all action in the East upon a previous agreement with Germany and Austria. For this reason, a renewal of the treaty ought not to be brought about except upon the basis of a perfect equality between the advantages secured to Russia and those secured to Germany, or upon the condition of giving both powers entire freedom, the one in the East, the other in the West, or, at any rate, of making that freedom conditional, in both cases, upon previous accord.
Of these two alternatives, the first seemed more advantageous to Russia, as leaving full liberty of action on both sides. In the case of a disintegration of Turkey, the occupation of the Straits was for us a vital question, the answer to which would have been greatly facilitated by our having procured in advance the assent of Germany and Austria to our acting according to our own desires in the Orient. A complete neutrality on the part of these powers would guarantee us against a European coalition and would isolate England, which would never yield to us the Straits.
