Page:American Historical Review, Vol. 23.djvu/341

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The End of the Alliance of the Emperors
331

Not one voice in France has renounced Alsace-Lorraine; at any moment a government may be established which will declare war. It may break out in ten days as readily as in ten years; nothing can be answered for. The war of 1870 was but child's play in comparison with the future war; on both sides an effort will be made to finish the adversary, to bleed him white, that the vanquished may not be able to rise again, and may never, for thirty years, dare even to think of the possibility of turning against the conqueror.

The Reichstag consented to increase the army for only three years instead of seven; it was dissolved, with a view to a new election.

This menacing language of Prince Bismarck and the armament of Italy, Switzerland, and Belgium alarmed France, which, on its side, proceeded to construct cantonments along its frontier, for shelter to the reservists in case they were called, and began a reorganization of its army in accordance with the plans of General Boulanger, minister of war. In a conversation with Baron Mohrenheim, ambassador of Russia, Flourens, who then had charge of foreign affairs, set forth the necessity for France to hold herself ready on short notice, while at the same time he scrupulously avoided giving any handle to false imputation of warlike designs; he repudiated all such in emphatic terms, sincerely and absolutely desiring, and intending, nothing but peace. France would not attack Germany unless the latter were strongly engaged elsewhere.

In reporting this conversation, Mohrenheim remarked that the government of the Republic sought for the moral support of Russia in case Germany should demand disarmament on the part of France. On reading this despatch, the Emperor Alexander III. noted on the margin that in such case France could count upon the moral support of Russia. M. de Giers, on his part, wrote to Mohrenheim, January 22, 1887, that the apprehensions of Flourens, as to aggressive intentions on the part of Bismarck, were exaggerated, for the latter had many times given assurances that Germany would not attack France. The declaration of Flourens that France would not declare war on Germany unless the latter was strongly engaged elsewhere, was worthy of attention; if that were the case the chances for maintaining peace appeared far from being exhausted; and as peace was for the interest of all governments, it could not logically be contrary to their intentions. In M. de Giers's view, of all the causes that might embitter the relations between Germany and France, one of the most potent would be the suspicion of an agreement between France and Russia inimical to Germany, for a strict friendship between Russia and Germany was the firmest security for