Page:American Historical Review, Vol. 23.djvu/344

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334
Serge Goriainov

able, with a view toward emphasizing the powerful agreement of the three empires in the face of the republican and anarchical tendencies which were devastating the rest of Europe, and also toward reducing the chance that Austria, left at one side and entirely free, should seek, on some turn of events, either to join Great Britain against us or to join France against Germany. This last conjunction was not likely, but it was quite possible that at the least complication Austria should seek alliance with Great Britain against us. Since, moreover, Bismarck had declared that in case of war between Russia and Austria he could not go beyond seeing to it that neither one of the two belligerents was mortally wounded, and since, for our part, we could perceive no chance of war between Austria and Germany, the establishment of a triple entente was plainly indicated by the political necessities of the moment.

Undoubtedly this entente would be the best guarantee of peace, which Russia needed, especially with regard to her future development. The cabinet of Vienna, directed at this time by Baron Haymerle, had much hesitation in taking part in the alliance which we were preparing to negotiate with Germany. It would have preferred to remain outside, free from any engagement with us. When finally she consented to take part in our engagements, her attention naturally fell especially upon the article framed to guarantee the advantages secured to Austria by the treaty of Berlin, such as the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the clause relating to the sanjak of Novi-Bazar. In order to make the stipulations of this article more precise, it was agreed that a protocol should be joined to the treaty, setting forth the special questions on which agreement had been reached.

But the events which had occurred in Bulgaria in the course of 1886, of which a prince protected by Austria had availed himself to seize power in despite of the treaty of Berlin, without the assent of the other great powers, were not of a nature to encourage the least step toward rapprochement between Austria and Russia. Accordingly M. de Giers recommended Shuvalov to consider carefully the idea of an arrangement with Germany alone, which should have as its objects: (1) to surround the maintenance of peace with solid guarantees, indispensable to the development of our military, naval, and financial strength, and to guard us against the danger of European coalitions by sincere and firm alliance with the most powerful of the neighboring states, whose influence was at present decisive in most questions arising in Europe and even in the Orient; (2) to prevent any arbitrary alteration of the territorial status quo