for the so-called Neches as the river intended by the treaty of 1819—and it would take long and tedious negotiations to determine the point; even if the question were settled in favor of Mexico, the nature of the boundary would inevitably require a large army to prevent wholesale smuggling; the large and increasing Indian population in Texas would place another burden on the inadequate military department; the notorious lack of confidence between Mexico and the present inhabitants of Texas, which had "in the short space of five years displayed itself in not less than four revolts, one of them having for its avowed object the independence of the country", must eventually involve the United States and Mexico in misunderstandings—though the former maintained an unswerving neutrality; and finally "the comparatively small value of the territory in question to Mexico, its remote and disconnected situation, the depressed and languishing state of her finances, and the still, and at the present particularly, threatening attitude of Spain, all combine to point out and recommend to Mexico the policy of parting with a portion of her territory, of very limited and contingent benefit, to supply herself with the means of defending the residue with the better prospect of success, and with less onerous burthens to her citizens". If Poinsett did not from his general knowledge of Mexican sentiment think it impolitic, he could further urge that because of her successive revolutions and the hostility of Spain the government was very unsettled and the confederation exposed to the danged of dismemberment. In such an event every one must see that "the first successful blow would, most probably, be struck in Texas".[1]
These instructions were largely based on an elaborate report prepared by that arch-schemer, Colonel Anthony Butler, of Mississippi, on the economic, political, social, and geographical condition of Texas. So far as one can check it, it appears on the whole accurate, except as to the four revolts in Texas.[2] Professor Von Holst thought it very inconsiderate of Jackson to take advantage of Mexico's distress and urge this cession when Spain was threatening invasion,[3] but one can only wonder whether Adams would have refrained, had the same conditions existed in 1827. Certainly Jackson does not suffer in a pecuniary comparison: he offered four million dollars more than Adams for a territory thousands of square miles smaller.
