verted writing … there was a gain of visual over motor control." (p. 52.) In the case of one reagent "the visual material represented a pseudo-control, but with the embarrassment of the motor situation it became actually directive." (p. 46.)
(5) A negative result of much importance for a later section of this paper is to the effect that "no evidence was found for the initiation of a voluntary act [italics Downey's] of writing without a sensory cue of some sort." (p. 142.)
(6) Another important result is that "throughout the whole series of experiments the report coming from the writing in terms either of kinæsthetic or visual sensations and images, proved to have a highly important function as part of the writing cue." (p. 142.) "A sensory kinæsthetic report on the movement as it proceeds is of course usually present, although it varies apparently in vividness and accuracy from individual to individual and has a different value for the same individual under different conditions." (p. 7.) "Many lapses occurred in B's writing of the verse, due, he asserts, to the lapsing or retarding of the grapho-motor report." (p. 63.) "Open errors frequently resulted from the lapsing of the grapho-motor report from the writing and were most often found in reagents of the first (motor) group." (p. 142.)
(7) "When automatic writing occurred, it was apparently, purely physiological in character." (p. 142.)
(8) In contrast to Ach and Woodworth's findings, Downey brings forth no evidence whatever in favor of an imageless consciousness which is at the same time operative in effecting control.
(9) Although "the experiments offer some evidence (which, however, is not 'unambiguous') for the existence of graphomotor imagery"[1] (p. 142), it is, however, perfectly clear that so far as control is concerned there is no evidence showing that such imagery is necessary.
To turn now to the broader aspect of this subject, it would appear that there are three important psychological concepts that have an indirect bearing upon the problem of voluntary movement. They are: (1) The Reflex arc concept. (2) The concept that all consciousness is motor. (3) The concept of motor and sensory forms of reaction.
Dewey has shown (The Reflex Arc in Psychology, Psy. Rev., Vol. 2, 1896, pp. 357-370) that the reflex arc concept should be given a fuller recognition in the study of movement and also in the study of all conscious processes and that once given such a recognition this concept necessitates a readjustment of psy-
- ↑ Cf.. Book: The Psy. of Skill, p. 54. Montana University Studies, Vol. I, No. I.
