METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS IN SOCIOLOGY 519
self with the other, but by attributing to the other certain pro- cesses like his own, and which he feels are individual in that other, but the correspondents of which are also individual in himself? He has certain processes which he recognizes as being his own; but among those which are his own he feels that there are some the like of which might be possessed by other individuals, and so on such a basis he judges the others to be of like kind with him- self. It might be asked: But in what way does he come to attribute or, to use Professor Giddings' term, "eject" those certain processes into the other individuals, and thus get con- sciousness of kind ? It seems probable that the process of ejection would take place upon seeing the other individual react in the same way in which the given individual would himself react upon certain processes which he feels to be a part of himself.
This analysis of the consciousness of kind as having an internal, and therefore appreciative, moment is merely a prelimi- nary to, yet substantiated by, Professor Ormond's exceedingly acute statement of the origin of consciousness of kind, when he holds that
The dialectic of the social consciousness is one in which the subject or self develops into a socius. This may be called the subject-moment of the activity. But the dialectic would not be conceivable if it did not include also a moment of objective activity which is determinative of the nature of the other. The peculiarity of the situation is that it is a compound dualism ; the subject determination resulting in a self that is a socius, while the object determina- tion in which, as we have seen, the moment of self is included, results in an object or other that is a self. The whole social situation must include, then, the representation of a subject that is a socius in dialectical relations with an object or other that is a social self, and the dialectic will be simply the recipro- cal or interacting relations of these self-terms in which each not only dis- tinguishes itself from its other in the fundamental differentiation of the self from its object or not-self, but also identifies itself with its other in the sense or notion of kind. In short, the social situation is a modification of the general psychic situation brought about by the incorporation into consciousness of the sense or notion of kind."
In view of this he observes that we subjectively apprehend the self that includes the other. This is without question appreciation. Someone might say that the social relationship is not such a
- Op. cit., p. 292.
