RELATION BETWEEN SOCIOLOGY AND ETHICS 673
Since ethics is dependent on sociology, it follows that it cannot be the same at all times, but must vary as its historical foundation varies under different historical conditions. Ideals and motives, aims and means, must be different. The historical development may lead to ethical turning-points or to ethical dilemmas, even though it is following its own natural laws without any breach of continuity. There may be ethical discontinuity, though there is sociological con- tinuity. I will give some examples.
Very often ethical development consists in this only, that what has been done involuntarily, or even unconsciously, under the influ- ence of social heredity, is afterwards done with clear consciousness or as a result of deliberate choice. Aristotle says that involuntary working precedes voluntary and conscious working. It is, he says, by playing on the zither that we become good players, and it is by acting justly that we become just ; in this way, the young are through education and tuition introduced to ways of acting and thinking which later on can be followed out with consciousness and free choice. When the time of involuntary imitation and exercise is over, it remains to be seen whether the same direction will be followed with full consciousness. But even if the young generation breaks off and adopts quite other ideals and endeavors, yet the first direction remains of great influence, both directly, as an element, and indi- rectly, through an effect of contrast. The sociological continuity is not broken, though new ideals and aims are acknowledged. The Aristotelian principle (so I name the law here spoken of) shows us a deeper connection, while from an ethical point of view there seem to be only disharmony and opposition.
But social development may also in a more positive way be the condition for ethical development. A thing which at first only had value as a means may later on acquire immediate value value as an end in itself. Social conditions make certain actions necessary, which the individual would not undertake if they were not favorable to his own interests ; for instance, he must respect the liberty of others, if he will have his own liberty respected. But later on he may adopt as his immediate end the liberty of all. There is here going on what I will call a subjective transformation of value. What is value at first only as a means has become value as an end. An objective transformation of value is going on when an end is so closely connected with the whole order of things that it cannot be isolated. The original end may then become a means to the acknowl-
